Border regions are rather “new regions in a changed international environment” (Plangger 2019: 158). They are positioned at the interface of manifold scalar politics (Johnson/Jones/Paasi et al. 2011; MacKinnon 2011). The scaling debate stresses that the dominant role of the national state, as it was known in the post-war decades, has been proliferated and relativised due to processes of globalisation and internationalisation (Harrison 2013: 58).

The multi-level governance approach is an important concept in this context. It reflects on the “changing relationships between the supranational, the national and the subnational level and between the public and the private sector” (Plangger 2019: 158). The rising EU regional policy was one of the main inspirations in this discourse (Hooghe/Marks 2001), and border regions played an important role in this debate (Perkmann 2007). New cooperation programmes and institutional routines offered an important opportunity for border regions to directly get in contact with the supranational level and to implement a range of funded projects (e.g. Harguindéguy/Bray 2009). A series of cooperation formats was established. The “classical” format of Euregios (or Euroregions) exist in parallel to further cooperation formats (Evrard/Engl 2018; Guillermo Ramírez 2018). In most border regions, different formats of cooperation overlap, in the territorial and the institutional sense. These soft spaces show a high variability as they can harden and weaken again, and they can disappear (Allmendinger/Chilla/Sielker 2014; Pupier 2020; Kaucic/Sohn 2021). A prominent geography of border regions is the European funding programme of INTERREG A (i.e. the cross-border cooperation strand of territorial cooperation). This programme does not only reflect the difference in national approaches to eligibility areas (from rather large-scale approaches in Scandinavia to a much smaller focus in countries like Germany). The programme also reflects territorial dynamics as the funding landscape may change from one funding period to the next.

Despite these considerable dynamics, the cross-border institutionalisations and their political mandates remain rather soft. Many political issues like health policy or spatial planning (Fricke 2015) remain predominantly in the hands of national authorities. On the regional level, the political, administrative and diplomatic frictions have to bridge across nation-state borders for which no simple solution applies. Adequate cooperation formats have to be developed for each institutional and actor setting, helping to bridge the “multi-level mismatch” along the borders (Chilla/Evrard/Schulz 2012).

In parallel, border regions are still an important object of national political agendas. The “secondary foreign policy” is an important example that reflects on border regions as objects and tools of national geopolitical strategies (Klatt/Wassenberg 2017). The establishment of cooperation formats in border areas can be associated with concrete political interests over time. Thus after World War 2 – especially on Germany’s western borders – the issue of peacekeeping and reconciliation was essential. After the opening of the “Iron Curtain”, the stabilisation of the new geopolitical setting and cohesion processes played an important role. More recently, the crises connected to the migration flows of 2015 and the pandemic since 2020 have shown that issues of national security manifest at European internal borders. These examples show that the national level obviously matters for border regions. However, academic reflection tends to see the national level as a rather residual player in a complex and dynamic setting and, thus, underestimates its role.

From a normative and practical point of view, this aspect is of high relevance. Cross-border cooperation has to carefully develop specific solutions. The key question is: “How to find the right degree of institutionalisation and the appropriate legal form for different cross-border tasks by developing a good balance between open network and classical organizational approaches whenever structuring the cross-border working context; how to avoid both institutional sclerosis and informal/individual arbitrariness?” (Beck 2019: 18). This perspective necessarily has to also consider the national dimension.

The underlying dilemma of political coordination in border regions is the following: Whereas domestic institutions of a given territory, in principle, can be coordinated in a classical “top-down” way, the “foreign” actors of a border region are beyond the scope of hierarchical coordination. This situation leads to a multiplicity of governance arrangements.

The debate on cross-border governance captures governance as a form of political management alongside hierarchy, primarily focusing on networks (Nienaber/Wille 2020). This network concept refers to an open setting of actors that can include a number of institutions and representatives in addition to those “actually responsible”. The territorial dimension of networks is not dominant at first glance as the networks “are based on vertical, horizontal, as well as lateral networks” (Zumbusch/Scherer 2015: 502). However, the co-operative arrangements tend to refer to the specific and “well-defined spatial reference framework” (Zumbusch/Scherer 2015: 502).

The diversity of structures and the limited governance capacity across the border means that actors from very different contexts have to face multiple challenges. In the earlier years of cooperation programmes, it could be said that one “national authority governs the development on one side of the border, another the other side and the general framework is set by the EU” (Jauhiainen 2002: 163). More recently, the linkages between networks and questions of power and mandates have been put at the forefront. Networks might even come along with a certain transfer of power away from the national level (Plangger 2019: 159) and might challenge national representation and political coordination (Frątczak-Müller/Mielczarek-Żejmo 2020: 10). Cross-border networks are considered to be “territorial development assets” (Berzi 2017: 1584) and network capacity is considered to be crucial for cross-border functioning and its diversities (Nienaber/Wille 2020: 3). They are often perceived as social networks that allow personal contacts and trust to be built beyond the border and, at the same time, that play relevant roles for institutions of representative democracies (Frątczak-Müller/Mielczarek-Żejmo 2020: 9).

Even if cross-border cooperation, strongly based on INTERREG funding, is often seen as a success story of Europeanisation, the relevance of national systems must not be overlooked. Many border-related problems are rooted in differing national legislations, and problem-solving capacity is also linked to the national level (cp. Medeiros 2018). The implementation of cooperation programmes shows contrasting implementation patterns depending on a number of factors, including the state systems involved. A series of studies shows the limited impact of cooperation dynamics, also due to long-standing historical settings, including the national policy frameworks (Colomb 2018; Noferini/Berzi/Camonita et al. 2020).

A range of arguments from classical multi-level governance debates are of great relevance in this context. Governance throughout the multi-level system comes along with “a shift in the mode of interaction from power and control to information exchange, communication and persuasion” (Benz/Eberlein 1999: 343). The intensive processes of communication and bargaining can be seen as “‘embedded games’, in which policy-making in one arena sets the context for negotiations in other arenas” (Benz/Eberlein 1999: 343). Empirical studies have shown that subnational authorities engage in dynamics of Europeanisation due to rational strategic reflections, also in fields beyond the explicit political mandates (e.g. Huggins 2018). A proactive position in governance dynamics tends to be part of a strategy that aims at maximising opportunities. A multitude of factors influences the success of multi-level engagements. These are not predominantly related to structural characteristics, but are linked to political context: “many domestic factors, such as embeddedness, party politics and interest compatibility are crucial to understanding the strategies and channels employed by territorial actors” (Callanan/Tatham 2014: 206). These factors result in stronger and weaker players concerning financial and regulatory ambitions. However, these new regional configurations are “not serving to replace inherited landscapes of territorially embedded state scalar organization but emerge alongside” (Harrison/Growe 2014: 37).

The literature review shows a rather dense discourse on spatialities, governance and networks in the cross-border dimension. However, the national, domestic dimension of the dynamics is addressed rather as a residual category. The national level is often seen as the defender of hierarchical, territorial authority: a rather traditional power vis-à-vis a multiplicity of multifaceted networks, and often as a black box.

By focusing on domestic governance, the present study adopts a complementary perspective (Fig. 1). This study focuses on linkages between public institutions and actors mandated with border-related tasks within nation states, excluding relations across the border are not the object of the analysis. The relevance of the issue is obvious. Firstly, the analytical relevance lies in a better understanding of governance processes and patterns along and across borders. If we accept that the national domestic mandate remains crucial and if we consider the high relevance of governance approaches for border regions, then a better understanding of the “domestic side” of the process is important.

Secondly, from the normative perspective, the domestic dimension is likely to bear potentials for learning processes (within and across countries) for improved governance arrangements. The potentials of effective policy coordination to strengthen cohesion processes are more than plausible – in particular, as border regions are often rather weak in socio-economic terms.

Against this background, the study at hand provides an exploratory overview of intranational coordination and networks with regard to border-related governance. The wording has to remain flexible: top-down approaches can best be captured as “coordinating” whereas bottom-up approaches can rather be described as networks or cooperative settings. The aim of the study is to reveal the national patterns, the relevance and the explanatory factors for the settings.

Fig. 2 visualises the results in a condensed manner. The countries are categorised in the five groups described above, based on the most important similarities of domestic coordination and networking. The x‑axis captures the intensity of intra-state interaction, reflecting the frequency of meetings and number of bodies, strategic orientation, resourcing, etc. The y‑axis illustrates the level at which networking and coordination is primarily anchored. This reflects the relationship between the more nationally coordinated networks and the more regional, bottom-up networks.

There is a certain correlation between the intensity of networking and anchoring at a central level: the stronger the national role, the higher the intensity of networking tends to be, even if there is no strict proportional link. For example, in Switzerland and in Austria, networking is more intensive than in a number of non-federal states.

The size of the squares indicates the number of inhabitants for each country. One might assume that increasing country size might be accompanied by a higher number of border-region actors, calling for more coordination. However, the displayed pattern does not show a relationship between country size and coordination patterns. Other explanatory factors apparently play a stronger role. Moreover, differences between Eastern and Western European countries can hardly be identified. Even if central forms of organisation can be found in the three Eastern European states of the sample, their positioning differs to such an extent that a categorisation according to East and West is inappropriate.

The following sections go into more detail with regard to the country groups.

Technically speaking, coordination of and networking amongst border regions takes place in manifold ways. Fig. 3 categorises the relevant networking formats and instruments, illustrated with one or more examples in the second column. These examples are typical for the presented format and characteristic for the involved country. The rows are arranged from top to bottom, indicating the increasing degree of formalisation.

The figure mentions one coordination format that is not part of the presented country groups. In recent years, the European Commission has been considering the future of border region development with the so-called cross-border review process (Sielker 2018; Verschelde 2019). In this context, the idea of so-called cross-border coordination points in the EU states has emerged, and is still in the process of political coordination (European Commission 2018). The logic of this proposal is of general importance: the idea is to establish contact persons between the individual border regions and the European level, which could simplify processes in the sense of bundled communication. The interviewees had differing opinions on this proposal, even if the general idea of structured networking was appreciated (e.g. Interviews 34, 39).

Furthermore, all analysed states take part in programmes of European territorial cooperation, in particular the INTERREG A strand on the cross-border level. The obligatory programming processes are an important basis for the networking of actors from the border areas. The form can be a purely administrative process across different levels, and it can also involve “hubs” such as the Austrian office of the cross-border working group.

In all countries, there is more than one instrument established to support the coordination and networking of border regions. Informal networks, for example, play a certain role in all countries. However, in a “laisser-faire” country like Germany, they are key for normal functioning, due to a lack of more formalised coordination mechanisms (Interview 16). In contrast, institutions in a comprehensive sense are only present in Hungary and France.

The effort of formal institutionalisation appears worthwhile if it helps to pursue a specific purpose. This is particularly the case if access to resources is to be regulated or if a clear role in coordination processes is to be established. In the case of Poland, the initiative to establish a legal personality was decided after several years of informal networking.

The multi-faceted patterns raise the question of which factors can explain the differences and the similarities between countries. As indicated in Fig. 3, simple determinism does not provide an explanation. Obviously, structural elements are not dominant. Neither geographical location (Eastern vs. Western Europe) nor country size determines the policy options. State structure, however, seems to play a certain role. The intensity of networking tends to be higher in centralist states, as the examples of France and Hungary show. However, the picture remains complex. Poland and the Czech Republic, both centralist countries, show large differences. The federal countries of Switzerland and Austria demonstrate higher networking dynamics than several non-federal states.

The country group of decentral coordination is particularly interesting, comprising states as different as Poland and Switzerland. The regional networking in the Polish case is the result of a bottom-up process of institutionalisation, whereas the Swiss case reflects a sophisticated system of federal multi-level balance. In both cases, the coordination and networking activities are intensive, and the regional level is important.

We can conclude that state structure makes certain coordination characteristics more probable, but does not determine them. The border-related patterns are characterised by contingency. Each setting aims to develop a best-fit approach, combining the most adequate tools and options. It obviously depends on the individual arrangements in each country and their political and administrative cultures. Over time, path dependencies develop.

Border regions are not territorial blocks but they have to be understood in terms of socio-spatial dynamics defined by social practice and discourse (Paasi 1999). This study reveals a large variety of intra-national coordination formats that do not reveal “standard patterns” and for which no simple explanation applies. Border regions are positioned at the interface of manifold scalar politics (MacKinnon 2011) and our findings support the critiques of a one-side focus on levels beyond the national level (Harrison 2013: 57). National scale certainly matters and nation state structures provide relevant context, as we have seen with the example of federal elements, centralist embeddedness and transnational alignment. These contexts do not delimit contingency in general, but facilitate or hamper certain activities.

The relevance of the national level also applies from the governance perspective. In the border regions’ search for fitting institutionalisation (Beck 2019), the resources of the national level are clearly relevant. The fact that resources are rooted on the national level does not mean that they have to be “hard” juridical instruments, they also comprise soft tools. Some of the instruments (networks, conference formats) have softened or hardened over time (cp. Pupier 2020). Soft elements – be they cross-border elements or domestic ones – are located “in the shadow” of classical authorities.

From the network perspective, most coordination formats can be categorised as rather soft network formats that do not fundamentally question established structures. They supplement the functioning of the public institutions, and they are instrumental as they serve the implementation of the interests of classical institutions.

The study sheds light on the evolutionary character of the patterns in place and on the relevance of path dependencies. This is well illustrated by the institutional hardening of the Polish network of border regions, the vanishing of the former Czech coordination initiative, and the prominent role of a key political person in Belgium. It remains an open question whether trends over time tend to lead to a higher degree of formalisation or whether there is rather a steady up and down of formalisation.

The domestic governance dimension is positioned between the rather classical inner-state hierarchies and the soft networking tools of cross-border governance. This sheds light on the challenges for border regions: they not only have to manage the misfits of administrative and political levels on either side of the border, they also have to bridge the frictions between clear domestic hierarchies and rather diffuse governance settings.

If cross-border networks are considered to be “territorial development assets” (Berzi 2017: 1584), there is also potential on the domestic side. Further potentials can be seen in learning processes and improving communication towards the European level. The complexity of European cross-border dynamics throughout the multi-level governance system is enormous. A stronger focus on inner-state networks of border regions can help achieve a better-structured dialogue.

From a normative perspective the question arises as to what “good governance of border-region coordination” could look like. This study has neither evaluated the coordination formats, nor can we judge the impact on border region development. Nevertheless, we can derive at least some initial arguments. Central coordination and firm structures might support strategic impact by influencing communication on the European and high domestic level. These elements certainly can help improve knowledge on border-related topics for a broad audience – assuming that the available resources are appropriate. Laisser-faire and decentralism are a good basis for bottom-up approaches of high efficiency, assuming that the actor settings and the communication channels fit. If intra-national learning processes are the main objective, regular meetings of decentral or central coordination bodies are certainly a promising tool. As a result, the best coordination system depends on both the main objectives of the coordination and the setting in place.