The global urban landscape is increasingly characterised by intensified development pressures and a shift towards market-led urban development in built-up areas (Heurkens/Hobma 2014; Li 2015). Densification, as a policy ideal, supports the vision of compact cities by reducing urban sprawl and fostering sustainable development (European Commission 2016), and is widely regarded as a means to provide more sustainable housing (Claassens/Koomen/Rouwendal 2020: 1; Hartmann/Dembski/Hengstermann et al. 2023: 465). While discussions often focus on inner-urban areas (Altrock 2022: 130), suburban areas hold substantial densification potential due to their low density and large portion of under- and unused land (Touati-Morel 2015: 604; Fassbender/Ludwig/Hild et al. 2022: 1). This potential is complicated by a tension between policy goals that promote compact, sustainable urban forms and prevailing market preferences in prosperous suburban neighbourhoods which continue to favour low-density housing (Couch/Karecha 2006: 360; Zakrzewski/Berndgen-Kaiser/Fox-Kämper et al. 2014). The conflict between policy goals and market preferences complicates the activation of densification potential to address housing shortages in suburban areas.

Mobilising land is also challenging for planning authorities, as it requires intervening in built-up areas with existing property rights (Hartmann/Needham 2016) and the interests of different actors (Gerber/Hengstermann/Viallon 2018: 17). Understanding the strategic decision making of the actors involved, such as private landowners or developers, and their land-related interests is therefore key (Bouwmeester/Gerber/Hartmann et al. 2023; Künzel/Korekt/Artmann et al. 2024). While municipal planning often sets the stage, private developers are frequently the primary drivers of densification (Filion/Leanage/Harun 2020: 314), acting as “central coordinators and catalysts” (Healey 1991: 224), who bridge the gap between users, investors and urban development (Henneberry/Rowley 2002: 99). Yet, their strategic decisions in densifying built-up areas remain poorly understood.

This study examines their decision making through the lens of resource management, defined here through Knoepfel/Larrue/Varone et al.’s (2007: 63) resource model, which understands resources as specific assets that developers utilise to execute projects. These resources include law, money, personnel, organisation, infrastructure, time, information, consensus, political support and force. This study understands resource management as the strategic configuration and deployment of specific assets, such as law, money and political support, which developers prioritise and leverage to navigate constraints and implement densification projects. Examining how developers manage these resources is essential because it directly reveals the strategic choices that distinguish different developer types and advances our understanding of suburban densification practices.

The core premise of this paper is that types of developers are distinguished by their different resource strategies and configurations. This means developer-typology and resource-model analysis are intrinsically linked. The paper identifies types of developers active in suburban densification, analysing their type-related characteristics and strategic decision making. Thus, the guiding research question is: How do developers strategically implement suburban densification? Two sub-questions are addressed: first, which types of developer are involved in suburban densification, and second, which factors influence their decisions, focusing on their resource management.

This paper investigates suburban densification in Dortmund through a single-case study. Dortmund serves as the unit of analysis due to the high level of developer-driven densification activity in the city’s suburban areas (Ehrhardt/Sommer/Ndim et al. 2025: 292). Understanding strategic behaviour requires a qualitatively orientated research design. Document analysis and semi-structured interviews are used as the main methods to analyse developers’ characteristics, strategies and decision making. The results highlight how developers’ resource management influences development outcomes and offer empirical insights into mechanisms of suburban densification.

Densification, defined as a “net increase in housing units” (Broitman/Koomen 2015: 34) within a developed area, is a complex process shaped by the actors involved, spatial conditions and planning orientation. The diversity of densification strategies suggests that land policies must accommodate varying conflicts of interests to support effective implementation (Puustinen/Krigsholm/Falkenbach 2022: 1). Strategies range from government-led approaches to those which rely more heavily on private sector initiatives (Puustinen/Krigsholm/Falkenbach 2022: 6), identified as owner-driven high-density and incremental development (Puustinen/Krigsholm/Falkenbach 2022: 6). This highlights private-sector involvement in suburban densification where small developers and homeowners drive local development (Touati-Morel 2015: 606). Infill development, particularly on small vacant lots, is crucial for housing supply but often occurs without direct municipal oversight (Pinnegar/Randolph/Freestone 2015: 281; Ehrhardt/Behnisch/Jehling et al. 2023: 194). Suburban densification therefore centres on small-scale, infill development largely influenced by private market actors rather than public authorities pursuing comprehensive urban planning goals.

This gives developers a central role in the dynamics of suburban densification. Property markets are not impersonal economic arenas but highly organised, complex networks of interacting organisations (Healey 1991: 220). Institutional perspectives shed light on key players within the property market, focusing on their roles and interrelationships (Healey 1991: 219). Behavioural perspectives emphasise actors’ power, informal routines and ideas rather than rigid rules (March/Olsen 2005; Barzelay/Gallego 2006; Bevir/Rhodes 2010). Behavioural perspectives are thus essential to analyse actors’ roles and strategies in suburban densification. The role of real estate developers is critical for shaping urban spaces. They act as primary catalysts for local economic development and have significant influence (Meijer/Buitelaar 2023: 1). Municipalities see developers as partners delivering housing projects, facilitating urban growth and alleviating municipal financial burdens (Eichhorn/Ehrhardt/Münter et al. 2024: 6). Developers can therefore be understood as “proactive agents who make things happen” (Charney 2007: 1179). Yet, the functions developers fulfil in development are diverse, making it challenging to apply a single generalised description (Coiacetto 2001; Meijer/Buitelaar 2023: 2). The literature provides several ways to characterise different types of developers. Common approaches distinguish developers by market segment (Brown 2015), by firm size and geographic scope, or by their level of proactive or reactive engagement in development (Coiacetto 2001), separating “active developers” who proactively initiate projects from “passive developers” who await emerging opportunities (Meijer/Buitelaar 2023: 2). Other frameworks focus on characteristics like vertical integration strategies (Ballard/Butcher 2020: 271; Meijer/Buitelaar 2023: 2).

McNamara’s (1983) behavioural typology of developers, based on their interest in developable land, adds depth to the understanding of development processes by integrating socio-political and social relations (Healey 1991: 228). It is constructed by examining the land-holding strategies of developers over time, linking a developer’s time horizon before development (e.g., acquiring and land asset banking) with their strategic decisions after development (e.g., sell, lease or self-use). This results in nine distinct types of developers, spanning from Entrepreneurial Builders focused on short-term action to Owner-Occupier Developers focused on long-term action (see Figure 1).

In densification processes, different types of developers undertake different projects. For instance, some build units for immediate sale, reflecting the type of Entrepreneurial Builders; while others prioritise rental housing for stable long-term returns (Rérat/Söderström/Piguet 2010; Götze/Bouwmeester/Jehling 2024: 1276), representing long-term holding strategies. Each developer type therefore contributes uniquely to housing supply, driven by specific project goals and strategic decisions (Götze/Bouwmeester/Jehling 2024: 1276). The typology of McNamara (1983) illustrates how varied objectives, from immediate returns to long-term investments, shape different development strategies. The significance of this typology is that it provides a nuanced framework that directly links developers’ actions to their underlying interests and holding strategies in land.

While the typology explains developers’ interests and identifies players in the market, it does not fully capture the reasoning behind their strategic behaviour. Developers rely on a defined institutional framework or regime that sets the “rules of the game” (North 1990: 3). This institutional context, including market dynamics, property rights and legal regulations, mediates interests and creates opportunities (D’Arcy/Keogh 2002: 26). Crucially, these institutional rules directly determine access to, use of and modification to the resources that developers can deploy. Institutional context hence greatly influences the resources a developer can access, such as financial capital, political connections or market knowledge, which in turn guide decision making (Adams/Disberry/Hutchison et al. 2002: 139).

This paper’s core theoretical argument is that while institutional context determines the available resources, the developer’s type, as defined by their fundamental business model and strategic objectives (McNamara 1983), dictates which of these resources are critical. Therefore, the type of developer and their primary resource configuration are co-constitutive: the developer type precedes the strategic deployment of resources, as a developer’s long-term identity and business model shape which resources they prioritise and cultivate. The resources are therefore best understood as the “hand of cards” held by the player, which are dealt by the institutional context. The specific hand a developer holds is largely determined by their developer type, and their strategic decisions are the “moves” they make with the cards they have been dealt.

To gain insights into the decision-making processes related to suburban densification, it is therefore useful to examine the resource management of developers. This is highly relevant for understanding developer behaviour because it allows us to move beyond static classifications to analyse developers’ dynamic, context-specific decision-making processes (Guy 2002: 265). This makes their strategic operations visible by focusing on how they manage, utilise and exchange resources to achieve their objectives. The analysis of the resources available, and the extent to which the institutional context affects them, offers valuable insights into processes, outcomes and impacts (Knoepfel/Larrue/Varone et al. 2007: 64).

This paper adopts the framework of Knoepfel/Larrue/Varone et al. (2007), which identifies ten key resources. These resources are the practical means or instruments, the “hand of cards” that a developer uses to shape interactions and influence outcomes, and which decides their strategic moves. The framework identifies ten such resources: law, money, time, personnel, information, organisation, infrastructure, consensus, political support and force. For instance, the law can be used not only to comply with regulations but also to secure legal rights or challenge administrative decisions (Knoepfel/Larrue/Varone et al. 2007: 66). Consensus can be built to legitimise actions and foster support (Knoepfel/Larrue/Varone et al. 2007: 87). Likewise, information is leveraged to reduce uncertainty and identify strategic opportunities (Knoepfel/Larrue/Varone et al. 2007: 71), while time can be managed as a critical factor in negotiations or as a bargaining tool (Knoepfel/Larrue/Varone et al. 2007: 87). Crucially, in applying this framework to property development, the resource of infrastructure is interpreted as the tangible property or land itself, the foundational asset required for any development project. Gaining control of this central “card” is, therefore, the primary prerequisite for any development initiative.

This framework is a comprehensive tool for analysing strategic behaviour because it recognises that these resources are not equally distributed; the “hand of cards” depends on the developer type. A core premise of this paper is that different developer types are explicitly distinguished by their distinct resource strategies and configurations. This analytical approach establishes a clear causal link from the macro-level institutional context (the rules of the game) to the micro-level strategic actions of developers (the players’ moves), demonstrating that a player’s strategy is fundamentally determined by the unique resources (hand of cards) that their specific type allows them to hold (see Figure 2).

This paper employs a two-phase mixed-methods approach designed to systematically investigate developer types and their resource management strategies in suburban densification. Phase 1 identifies and categorises developers based on their fundamental business models. A document analysis is conducted to map out the developer markets in Dortmund. Developers active in suburban densification are assigned to different types of developers. To this end, the paper examines the strategic decisions of developers based on the resources “in their hand” through qualitative interviews and content analysis. This approach enables a comprehensive view of developer types and the relevant resources they employ, furthering understanding of how developers strategically implement suburban densification.

Identifying the distinctions among developers is essential for comprehending the different outcomes of suburban densification. Developers differ in their market focus and strategic orientation, influenced by the scale at which they operate. For this reason, an in-depth analysis of the developer market in Dortmund was undertaken to categorise developers relevant to suburban densification. A document analysis of various media sources and the online presence of the specific developers also allowed a descriptive characterisation of operational attributes and activities. Through a skimming process involving keyword search strings (Bowen 2009: 32) in search engines, developers engaged in densification projects were identified. The specific German search strings employed included: “Bauträger UND Dortmund”, “Nachverdichtung UND Dortmund”, “Projektentwicklung UND Dortmund”. The inclusion criteria required developers to have at least one completed or ongoing suburban densification project within Dortmund’s city limits in the last five years. Developers focused exclusively on non-residential or large-scale greenfield projects were excluded. A total of 26 developers were initially selected: this was reduced to 22 developers who operated specifically in suburban areas.

The qualitative document analysis was intended to offer insights into the different types of developers operating in Dortmund’s residential property market who aimed to make use of densification potentials. To address the potential for self-promotional bias in online sources, the analysis focused on verifiable operational indicators rather than marketing claims. The semi-structured interviews in Phase 2 served as a key method for triangulating and validating these initial classifications. 83 documents formed the analysis sample from company websites and other accessible internet sources, offering valuable insights into developers’ characteristics and supporting an understanding of their roles (Merriam/Tisdell 2016: 118).

To systematically distinguish between developer types, the content analysis operationalised McNamara’s (1983) typology by creating a structured coding frame. This process involved examining the document sample for verifiable indicators corresponding to the typology’s two core dimensions: (1) the time horizon of land holding before development, and (2) the strategic decision concerning the asset after development. For example, developers were coded as having a short-term holding strategy if the documents emphasised a quick project turnover and sale. Conversely, a long-term strategy was indicated by a focus on building a rental portfolio or developing for self-use. The post-development strategy was determined by analysing project portfolios to distinguish between build-to-sell (characteristic of Entrepreneurial Builders) and build-to-rent/hold models (characteristic of Property-Improvers or Owner-Occupiers). By systematically coding each developer against these operationalised criteria, it was possible to assign them to one of the identified types. This structured coding allowed a descriptive representation of the property market by identifying patterns, affiliations and common traits across developers. By extending the analysis of developers beyond consideration of their holding strategies in land (McNamara 1983), different types could be identified in the sample. The resulting characterisation for each type not only helped to describe relevant groups of developers thoroughly but also gave an insight into their preferred densification strategies and development scope.

To analyse the resource management of developers in suburban densification processes, it is essential to examine the development process, motivations and interests of the types identified in the first phase of the research. Qualitative semi-structured interviews are particularly useful for uncovering drivers behind strategic behaviour and revealing the enabling policy environment developers operate in, providing deeper insights into actors’ motivations (Maryudi/Fisher 2020: 143). Such interviews allow exploration of the situational meanings, motives and everyday theories of developers that are hidden in their development choices. From the initial sample of 22 developers active in suburban densification, eight agreed to participate in the interviews. To clarify the representativeness of the interview sample, Table 1 provides an overview linking the anonymised interview partners to the developer types discussed in the results.

The interview guideline is based on the analytical framework of resource management (Knoepfel/Larrue/Varone et al. 2007) and addresses unique aspects of suburban densification. The objective was to identify which resources were most critical for each developer type, analyse their interrelation and explore how the developer types manage these resources. Following the interviews, a qualitative content analysis adapted to the framework of resource management was performed on the datasets to analyse resource management across developer types. The coding frame combined concept-driven categories and data-driven codes, allowing a comprehensive analysis of developers’ resource management strategies. By focusing on a framework-oriented analysis, a detailed understanding of developers’ motivations and strategies is achieved, along with insights into the critical resources they deploy. The determination of a resource as “critical” was not based on the mere frequency of its mention, but on its perceived impact on project outcomes and its strategic importance as articulated by the developers themselves. The analysis focused on identifying the resources that fundamentally enabled or constrained a developer’s specific business model.

Through document analysis, four of the nine theoretically derived types of developers were identified as relevant for densifying suburbia in Dortmund (see Figure 3). Each type displays distinct characteristics and behaviour. Their strategies move between incremental infill-development and larger brownfield or hinterland projects, with varying focuses on market segments, risk tolerance and interaction with regulatory frameworks. The findings demonstrate a clear dichotomy, which forms the central argument of this paper: short-term developer types strategically leverage market-dependent resources like money and time, while long-term types rely on relationship-dependent resources such as organisation and political support. This confirms the theoretical premise that a developer’s type, defined by their core business strategy, dictates the specific “hand of cards” they must play. While all developers require access to most resources to some degree, the following sections highlight those that are uniquely configured or prioritised by each type, thereby defining their strategic approach to densification.

The discussion systematically integrates the empirical findings with the theoretical framework to clarify the causal mechanisms driving market-led suburban densification. Developer strategies are not arbitrary but represent outcomes of specific resource configurations within a given institutional setting. This study uses McNamara’s (1983) framework to identify four types of developers relevant for suburban densification in Dortmund: Entrepreneurial Builders, Land Developer-Investors, Property-Improvers and Owner-Occupier Developers. The key contribution of this paper lies in empirically linking developer types to distinct resource management configurations. This reveals a fundamental dichotomy between short-term types who leverage market-dependent resources (e.g., money and time), and long-term types who rely on relationship-dependent resources (e.g., organisational and political support).

These findings challenge generalised views of developer behaviour by demonstrating that strategic choice is fundamentally shaped by a type-specific resource configuration, moving beyond a planning-led view to identify private actors as the central catalysts of urban development. Suburban densification is predominantly driven by small and medium-sized enterprise developers. Unlike international investors who typically favour large-scale urban projects, these local and regional small and medium-sized enterprise developers dominate suburban markets (Eichhorn/Ehrhardt/Münter et al. 2024: 3). This localised approach highlights the developers’ proactive engagement, which often occurs outside direct municipal control, reinforcing their importance in shaping suburban development, particularly given the passivity of German land policies (Ehrhardt/Behnisch/Jehling et al. 2023: 206). These dynamics illustrate that suburban densification is not primarily guided by public planning objectives but emerges as a market-driven process in which the strategic behaviour of developers plays a decisive role.

This study’s framework explains how macro-level institutional conditions translate into micro-level development practices. The institutional context defines the overarching “rules of the game” (North 1990: 3) determining which resources are accessible and valuable. In suburban development, these institutional “rules” are conditioned by financialisation, legal frameworks and land accessibility.

Financialisation, characterised by the dominance of financial actors in urban development (D’Arcy/Keogh 2002: 27), has reshaped residential densification into a property-led investment strategy. This creates pressure for rapid returns and risk-averse behaviour, which most strongly affects Entrepreneurial Builders and Land Developer-Investors, whose defining feature is a reliance on money and time as critical resources. In demand-driven markets, where single-family homes remain a safe investment (Eichhorn/Ehrhardt/Münter et al. 2024: 7), empirical evidence highlights that Entrepreneurial Developers favour these developments as they align with lower risk thresholds and offer stability in uncertain markets. Their dependence on these market-sensitive resources causes them to adopt conservative, opportunistic strategies: they prioritise projects within existing regulations to avoid costly delays. Consequently, this risk aversion limits innovation in densification, leading to strategic conservatism. Here, the rules of the game, set by financial pressures, determine that the “cards” of money and time are most valuable, leading these players to make moves focused on immediate returns and risk mitigation.

Legal regulations and bureaucratic processes shape developers’ strategies. The German legal framework and the passivity of municipalities create an environment where private developers often dictate the pace of development. Highly regulated planning frameworks often delay or complicate suburban densification efforts. These bureaucratic and lengthy planning processes cause developers to focus on areas with existing development plans, which provide more predictable outcomes and shorter timelines (Eichhorn/Ehrhardt/Münter et al. 2024: 5). Outdated development plans and lengthy bureaucratic processes remain significant hurdles, reducing the efficiency of resource allocation and implementation for more housing (Hartmann/Dembski/Hengstermann et al. 2023: 469). Developer types navigate this context differently based on their resource sets, or “hands of cards”. Short-term types (Entrepreneurial Builders and Land Developer-Investors) treat the law as a fixed constraint. To protect the time resource, they strategically select sites with existing zoning rights, avoiding the planning process itself. In contrast, long-term types (Property-Improvers and Owner-Occupier Developers) treat the law as malleable. They leverage political support and organisation, using strong local networks to proactively negotiate regulatory adjustments and even draw up new development plans. This difference in resource configuration causes two distinct “moves” for engaging with municipal power: one of compliance and one of negotiation.

Access to land represents a critical challenge, with fragmented property rights and owner inertia presenting significant barriers (Reiß-Schmidt 2018: 998; Brenner/Haas/Krüger et al. 2024: 10; Künzel/Korekt/Artmann et al. 2024). Infilling of small, undeveloped plots has proven to be a viable solution (Ehrhardt/Behnisch/Jehling et al. 2023: 194). This institutional context of fragmented landownership and data opacity favours local small and medium-sized enterprises. They respond to this using real estate agents or a strong local network to gain access to land. Local small and medium-sized enterprises possess strong local networks, which function as a critical organisation resource. Property-Improvers, for example, rely on personal networks to be contacted directly by landowners. Land Developer-Investors, often lacking these deep local ties, rely on intermediaries like estate agents, making the information resource critical for them. The importance of these resources explains the observed dominance of small and medium-sized enterprises in this market, as their specific resource endowment gives them a competitive advantage in securing land, leading to a strategy of localised, incremental densification.

In summary, the institutional context, such as market pressures, legal regulations and planning culture, determines which resources are available and valuable, setting the “rules of the game” (North 1990: 3). The developer type is defined by the specific “hand of cards” they hold; that is, their unique and stable configuration of these resources, and their dependency upon them. Therefore, strategic behaviour is not an independent choice but is fundamentally dependent on the resources available to a specific type. A strategy is the “move a player makes” with the cards they have been dealt. This explains why resource management is type specific and how such configurations shape and constrain strategic options.

While developers strategically play the hand they are dealt, it is ultimately the municipality and the legislator who hold the power to change the “rules of the game” itself. As the creators of the institutional context, they define the rules of law and endowment of resources like money and legal authority. By altering this context, planners and policymakers can influence which “cards” hold the most value, thereby reshaping how the game is played and encouraging development towards more desirable outcomes. However, the interplay between municipalities and developers in suburban densification reveals significant power asymmetries that currently favour developers. Developers capitalise on these disparities to select the most profitable projects (Eichhorn/Ehrhardt/Münter et al. 2024: 6), which implies that there is a risk that housing demand may not be met and that insufficient building may occur (Erlwein/Meister/Wamsler et al. 2023: 8).

Developers are not cheating the system but are just playing their cards wisely to win the game. Municipalities and legislators are often unwilling or unable to change the “rules of the game”. They frequently lack the political will or necessary legal framework to adapt to market dynamics, placing them in a reactive rather than proactive role. Developers, meanwhile, not only react to rules, they can reshape rule interpretation through practice, lobbying and incremental precedent-setting (Buitelaar/Lebbing/Pelzer et al. 2024). Therefore, although authorities possess the formal authority to rewrite the rules, their current inability or reluctance to deploy their power effectively allows the institutional context to continue to favour developers’ strategic operations, making it the primary force shaping suburban densification.

The paper shows that developer types differ in their resource-management configurations and resulting strategies. In Dortmund, four developer types were empirically identified: Entrepreneurial Builders, Land Developer-Investors, Property-Improvers and Owner-Occupier Developers. Distinct resource priorities explain why different types pursue different densification strategies. The key contribution is empirical: the paper links a behavioural typology (McNamara 1983) to a resource-management lens (Knoepfel/Larrue/Varone et al. 2007) to explain why particular types act as they do under local institutional settings. By conceptualising the institutional context as the “rules of the game” and resources as the “hand of cards”, the study demonstrates how a developer’s type is defined by their unique resource configuration, which in turn dictates their strategic behaviour.

Addressing the study’s sub-questions, four key developer types were identified in Dortmund: Entrepreneurial Builders, Land Developer-Investors, Property-Improvers and Owner-Occupier Developers. The first two focus on low-density, small-scale infill development, primarily single-family homes, while the latter two engage in larger revitalisation and multi-family projects for both ownership and rental markets. Their approaches are shaped by resource management, particularly financial conditions, regulatory frameworks and land availability. Developers with short-term perspectives (Entrepreneurial Builders and Land Developer-Investors) are highly market dependent, prioritising quick returns and playing the “game” with a focus on speed and efficiency. Those with longer-term strategies (Property-Improvers and Owner-Occupier Developers) mitigate financial risks over time and leverage political networks to navigate regulatory barriers, demonstrating a willingness to engage in more complex “moves” to achieve their goals.

In answering the main research question “How do developers strategically implement densification?” this paper finds that developers act within institutional frameworks that significantly shape their strategic implementation of densification. Entrepreneurial Builders and Land Developer-Investors dominate the suburban densification landscape by focusing on lower-risk infill developments. These types treat the legal framework as a fixed set of “rules” and will only make “moves” – that is, pursue projects – where densification is already permitted. Their strategies reveal a power imbalance, as their focus on opportunistic, legally compliant projects means that densification often occurs without strategic public guidance. Property-Improvers and Owner-Occupier Developers, in contrast, leverage their relationship-dependent “cards” (like political support and organisation) to negotiate with municipalities and actively change the “rules” for specific projects, enabling denser and more sustainable outcomes. These different strategic “moves”, one based on compliance, the other on negotiation, underline the need for municipalities to better understand market dynamics to align suburban densification with strategic urban planning goals.

The qualitative case study approach, focusing on Dortmund, provides valuable insights but also presents limitations. The localised nature of the study means that findings may not fully translate to markets with a higher demand for housing or more internationalised developers. Furthermore, transparency issues in landownership structures limit visibility of market concentrations. A broader comparative study across different cities or national contexts with varying institutional frameworks would deepen understanding of suburban densification dynamics. While the small sample size of interviews offers limited insights, the applied framework effectively captures the heterogeneity of developer strategies, illustrating their dependence on regulatory conditions and available resources.

This paper contributes to the academic discourse by expanding the discussion on suburban densification beyond planning instruments and citizen perspectives. While previous research into developers active in densification has focused on negotiating practices (Bouwmeester/Hartmann/Ay et al. 2024) or power imbalances (Gerber/Debrunner 2022), this paper advances the discourse on the micro-foundations of developer strategies. By empirically linking developer types to distinct resource configurations, this investigation reveals how strategic choice is a direct consequence of the “hand of cards” a developer holds within a given institutional context. Suburban areas require greater attention in academic debate, and this paper addresses this gap, linking it to developer strategies. Future research should further explore how municipalities and market actors can structure their relationships to support sustainable development.

The findings offer critical, type-related policy implications. For short-term types (Entrepreneurial Builders and Land Developer-Investors), who will only pursue densification where it is already permitted, planners cannot rely on negotiation. To encourage this incremental, market-led infill, municipalities must proactively change the “rules of the game” by creating as-of-right development potential through simplified approval processes, or pre-approved densification typologies. These developers will simply not “play” in areas without such clear rules. Conversely, for long-term types (Property-Improvers and Owner-Occupier Developers), a different policy approach is required. These developers hold the “cards”, (e.g., political support and organisation) needed for complex, negotiated projects. Planners should engage these actors as strategic partners for larger-scale densification that requires bespoke planning solutions, like new development plans. A possible policy approach here could involve the creation of flexible, collaborative planning frameworks that allow for negotiation and co-production. Ultimately, recognising that different developer types are playing different “games” is crucial for effective policy. By understanding which “cards” each type holds and what “moves” they are willing to make, planners can use their own power more strategically to change the rules and guide market-led densification towards more sustainable and publicly beneficial outcomes.