This case centres on the contested transformation of mobility in Bavaria, focusing on civil society mobilisation around cycling policy at the local and state levels (for more on the multi-level governance dimension, see Loffing/Levin-Keitel 2025). The focal point is the Cycling Referendum Bavaria Alliance (CRBA), a state-wide initiative led by a broad alliance of local cycling campaigns, civil society organisations and opposition parties. CRBA core demands included a Bavarian cycling law, safer cycling infrastructure and a stronger political commitment to cycling as part of the mobility transition. The main instrument was a state-level direct-democratic procedure with the potential to culminate in a binding referendum (Volksbegehren, see Art. 64-79 LWG).

The Bavarian State Election Act (Bayerisches Landeswahlgesetz − LWG) as published 5 July 2002 (GVBl. p. 277, 620, BayRS 111-1-I), as last amended by the Act of 23 May 2022 (GVBl. p. 218).

Analytically, the case study is best understood as a planning-related spatial conflict because it concerns the redistribution, regulation, use and symbolic meaning of street space (Loffing/Levin-Keitel 2025; Loffing 2026). Simultaneously, it exceeds a narrow understanding of planning conflict because it not only concerns spatial allocation, but is also linked to legal admissibility, democratic procedures, public problem framings and political ownership. Therefore, the case involves both a substantive conflict over space and two interrelated meta-conflicts.

The first is a meta-conflict over conflict recognition. This concerns whether tensions around mobility transformation are acknowledged as conflict at all, whose problem framings are politically recognised, who counts as a legitimate conflict actor, and whether dissent is treated as democratically productive or as illegitimate disruption. The governing parties, the Christian-Social Union (CSU) and the Free Voters, frequently frame cycling policy in consensual and depoliticised terms, insisting that all actors pursue a “common goal” (Bayerischer Landtag 2022: 14624) and that no mode of transport should be “played off against another” (Interview 17: State Ministry for Housing, Building and Transport, 2023). By contrast, opposition and civil society actors more openly articulate conflicting interests, such as those between mobility transition activists and car-centred political-economic structures (ADFC Bayern 2023).

The second is a meta-conflict over conflict processing and concerns the arenas, procedures and institutional logics through which such conflict should be handled. While direct-democratic instruments exist, they operate under restrictive legal conditions and contentious demands are often strategically contained, selectively incorporated or pre-empted before they can fully unfold in electoral or direct-democratic form. Therefore, this case is particularly revealing because planning-related spatial struggles are inseparable from broader disputes over democratic conflict recognition, arena selection and modes of conflict processing.

The cycling conflict originated in the planning arena because its substantive core concerns the construction of cycling infrastructure, street-space redistribution and modal prioritisation. However, unlike many classic planning conflicts, it did not begin as resistance to a proposed intervention. Rather, civil society mobilised around the perceived absence, delay or insufficiency of planning action. The case is hence best understood as an inverse planning conflict: actors politicised planning inaction and translated demands for mobility transformation into both concrete local proposals and state-wide legislative claims. This dynamic was reinforced by the public’s everyday antagonistic experiences in traffic, which were often framed in the public discourse as “war” or “close combat” between cyclists and car drivers (Bayerischer Landtag 2021a: 12), making visible the underlying spatial tensions over scarce street space.

Planning actors increasingly responded through participatory and consultative formats, such as digital reporting tools, citizens’ assemblies or dialogue formats (Interview 20: Bavarian Academy for Rural Areas, 2024). Administrative actors recognised civil society input as valuable but also emphasised the need to translate broad demands into incremental, manageable interventions: “Of course, I have to temper those [high expectations]; that’s my job, at the end of the day” (Interview 23: County administration office, 2024). Some actors drew explicit technocratic boundaries around mobility decisions, arguing that even elected local politicians were “laypersons” and therefore should refrain from “interfering” and leave transport policy to the “experts” (Interview 9: Free Voters, 2023). Thus, the planning arena constitutes the initial site of conflict, as well as a site in which conflict was only partially processed, prompting subsequent shifts into other arenas (see Figure 1).

From the planning arena, the conflict increasingly moved into the protest arena through local cycling initiatives across Bavaria. These initiatives actively politicised local mobility conditions, rendered deficiencies visible and pushed cycling concerns into broader public and political debates. Bicycle demonstrations served as highly visible forms of claims-making and collective identity formation as a “cycling family” (Freymark 2022). These practices make indicator 2 (visibility of diverse articulations of dissent) and indicator 4 (mobilisation of passions) particularly observable.

Local initiatives also moved beyond protest through the drafting of desired cycling networks, identification of dangerous areas, and organising site visits with politicians and administrators to translate everyday experiences into actionable planning knowledge (e.g. Interview 3: Local citizens’ initiative, 2023). Civil society actors may act as strategic allies for cycling-friendly local authorities because they can provide a progressive, positive voice in support of politically challenging measures (BALM 2023). In some cases, these activities led to more institutionalised cross-arena cooperation, such as local cycling working groups involving politicians, administrators and civil society (e.g. Interview 10: Municipal administration, 2023). Such arrangements are especially relevant for indicator 5 (focus on the democratisation of democracy) because they broaden participation beyond formal representative institutions and create spaces in which disagreements can become processable without being fully depoliticised. Simultaneously, these opportunities coexisted with strong power asymmetries. In some municipalities, protests were delegitimised as “maximally populist” and “a few lunatics out and about again” (Interview 9: Free Voters, 2023). Such devaluation undermines the recognition of opponents as legitimate adversaries and weakens indicator 3. Notably, the media arena played an ambivalent role. It had the potential to intensify polarisation or to limit access to local decision-makers and stage structured disagreements, for example, through contentious debates in newspapers that publicly foregrounded unresolved conflict (e.g. Lang/Vettori 2022).

From 2016 onwards, cycling conflicts in 11 Bavarian municipalities entered the direct-democratic arena through local cycling referendums, paralleling developments in more than 50 German municipalities. Interviewees described these instruments as “getting people excited about democracy” through issue-based participation beyond elections (Interview 26: Cycling Referendum Bavaria, 2024) and making representative democracy “more representative” (e.g. Interview 6: More Democracy Bavaria, 2023). This scenario makes indicator 5 particularly visible. In many Bavarian cities, municipal councils adopted central demands before a binding referendum took place. Compared to other citizens’ petitions, cycling-related initiatives were accepted with above-average frequency, functioning primarily as agenda-setting instruments (Rehmet/Socher/Müller 2025: 27). In some cases, this translated into increased resources, specific infrastructure measures or follow-up participation in implementation processes (Interview 26: Cycling Referendum Bavaria, 2024). However, implementation frequently remained incomplete and delayed.

Parallel to local mobilisation, the Bavarian chapter of the General German Cycling Association (ADFC) had advocated a state-wide cycling law since 2018. This demand emerged partly in response to the Cycling Programme Bavaria 2025, which committed the state to doubling the modal share of cycling to 20 % by 2025 (Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern, für Bau und Verkehr 2018: 8). While the ADFC acknowledged that the programme incorporated long-standing demands, it criticised it as an “empty promise” without binding implementation or legal force (ADFC Bayern 2018a). The demand for a cycling law was taken up by several parties in the electoral arena. Alliance 90/The Greens and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) incorporated it into their programmes, the Free Voters signalled support and the CSU party conference adopted a resolution in favour of a cycling law in 2019 (ADFC Bayern 2018b; Bayern SPD 2018: 49; Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Landesverband Bayern 2018: 23; CSU-Landesleitung 2019: 263–264). However, this internal endorsement was not followed by implementation.

In a 2021 hearing in the Bavarian parliament, experts – including representatives from civil society – were invited to assess the conditions for cycling, discuss its potential and outline possible courses of action for the state (Bayerischer Landtag 2021a). The hearing was significant for the subsequent trajectory of the conflict because several measures later adopted by the state government can be traced back to demands articulated there (Interview 1: AGFK Bavaria, 2023), for example, the Cycling Offensive Climate State Bavaria

https://www.bayern.de/radoffensive-klimaland-bayern (21.04.2026).

As it became clear that local referendums and lobbying would not secure a state-wide cycling law, the conflict was deliberately shifted into the direct-democratic arena through the Cycling Referendum Bavaria (Radentscheid Bayern). In itself, this arena shift can be interpreted as an expression of agonistic agency: actors reflexively moved into another institutional setting when planning and parliamentary channels proved ineffective in achieving certain goals.

The campaign began in 2022 and quickly formed a broad alliance, linking local initiatives, non-governmental organisations and parties. For the draft cycling law, organisers deliberately chose what they considered to be the safest variant, even “sacrificing” more ambitious elements to minimise grounds for potential legal rejection.

https://radentscheid-bayern.de/haeufige-fragen/der-vollstaendige-text-fuer-das-radgesetz-bayern (21.04.2026); see also https://radentscheid-bayern.de/newsletter-archiv?email_id=9 (21.04.2026) and https://radentscheid-bayern.de/newsletter-archiv?email_id=19 (21.04.2026).

The campaign adopted a lion symbol, invoking Bavaria’s heraldic animal while signalling determination, strength and assertiveness. For instance, at protests, activists were encouraged: “You must roar […] You are lions” (Gerl 2022). Yet, overall, the campaign maintained a deliberately moderate public profile. The organisers sought a “non-partisan vibe” (Interview 26: Cycling Referendum Bavaria, 2024) and explicitly avoided forming formal alliances with more controversial climate protest groups (Interview 2: Cycling Referendum Bavaria, 2023), who advocated further-reaching anti-capitalist goals and used more confrontational forms of action, such as abseiling from bridges over motorways (e.g. Achternbosch/Kastner 2023). Yet even the direct-democratic arena faced repression when several supporters of the referendum accidentally signed multiple times and were then interrogated for suspected electoral fraud, which was interpreted as a “highly disproportionate response” that “does not bode well for direct democracy” (Interview 6: More Democracy Bavaria, 2023).

In July 2022, amid the referendum campaign, the state government presented its own measures to promote cycling, including the construction of 1,500 km of new cycle paths by 2030 (Bayerische Staatsregierung 2022). Although the Cycling Referendum Bavaria Alliance (CRBA) described these measures as a “modest first success” resulting from their pressure, they criticised the measures as “minimal additions to a ‘business as usual’ policy”, noting that standards, resources and responsibilities remained unclear without a cycling law.

https://radentscheid-bayern.de/newsletter-archiv?email_id=5 (21.04.2026).

Just one day after the CRBA and the Ministry of the Interior agreed on a date for submitting the admissibility application in January 2023, the Bavarian Minister-President Markus Söder publicly announced that the state government would pursue its own cycling law.

x.com/Markus_Soeder/status/1615997493992472577 (07.04.2026); https://radentscheid-bayern.de/newsletter-archiv?email_id=13 (21.04.2026).

This situation intensified when the Ministry of the Interior referred the application for admissibility to the Bavarian Constitutional Court in March 2023 due to doubts regarding admissibility.

https://www.bayern.de/herrmann-volksbegehren-radentscheid-bayern (07.04.2026).

The law was introduced through the governing parliamentary groups rather than through the state government, which reduced the amount of consultation that was formally required (Interview 11: Free Voters, 2023). Notably, civil society actors central to the conflict were not formally involved in drafting the law. The priority was to reach a quick, pragmatic outcome because it was seen as “always […] a bit of a problem when many people are having their say” (Interview 11: Free Voters, 2023). This strategy was sharply criticised by opposition and civil society actors, who portrayed the law as having been “rammed through” in a top-down manner (Interview 1: AGFK Bavaria, 2023) and “simply cobbled together in a back room” (Bayerischer Landtag 2023b: 21682). Thus, the conflict was processed in a way that acknowledged pressure while limiting the political agency of those who had generated it (Interview 6: More Democracy Bavaria, 2023).

When the Constitutional Court declared the referendum inadmissible in June 2023, arguing that parts of the draft encroached upon federal competences, the direct-democratic path was formally closed.

https://www.bayern.verfassungsgerichtshof.de/media/images/bayverfgh/8-ix-23-pressemitt-entscheidung.pdf (21.04.2026).

This development can be interpreted as a form of sequential neutralisation: first, opposition proposals were rejected by the government; second, the conflict was contained by shifting it from the direct-democratic arena to the legal arena; third, the governing parties occupied the policy field in the electoral arena through more moderate government counter-legislation without including civil society (selective appropriation). Therefore, the conflict was not simply about the substance of a cycling law, but also about timing, issue ownership and institutional control. This can be interpreted as revealing a depoliticising tendency with the conflict being settled before a public vote could force a more visible confrontation between competing mobility futures. Although such dynamics regarding cycling referendums are not unique to Bavaria

https://www.mobilitaetsforum.bund.de/DE/Themen/Wissenspool/Berichte/Webinar_Diskurs-am-Dienstag_230912_Druck-von-der-Strasse.html (11.05.2026).

However, this did not end the conflict; it transformed it. The object of struggle shifted from whether a cycling law should exist to what that law means in practice, how it is implemented and whether it will be revised. The later creation of the Cycling Alliance (Radallianz) under Article 12 of the Bavarian Cycling Law can be read as an institutionalised follow-up arena that to some extent incorporates movement actors into consultative governance, while leaving open the question of how far this inclusion enables meaningful influence over implementation.

https://radentscheid-bayern.de/gruendungssitzung-der-radallianz-bayern-als-neuem-runden-tisch-zu-radverkehrsthemen (21.04.2026).

The Bavarian cycling conflict demonstrates that agonistic agency is empirically observable across all analysed arenas, albeit unevenly and under shifting institutional conditions. Democratic contestation around mobility is not reducible to the design of participatory planning procedures. Rather, agonistic agency emerges through movement between the planning, protest, media, electoral, direct-democratic and legal arenas. Therefore, an arena-sensitive perspective is crucial because it reveals that where one arena constrains agonistic agency, another may temporarily expand it.

Indicator 1 (Understanding of contingency and the irreducibility of conflict) was most visible where actors explicitly framed street-space allocation and mobility priorities as politically contingent and contestable, rather than as technical or naturalised. This was particularly pronounced in the protest, direct-democratic and electoral arenas, where civil society and opposition actors challenged prevailing mobility arrangements and acknowledged redistributive trade-offs. By contrast, in the planning arena, technocratic framings often narrowed public recognition of contingency by presenting decisions as being primarily expert driven. Therefore, the meta-conflict over whether mobility transformation constitutes a genuine political conflict is closely tied to this indicator.

Indicator 2 (Visibility of diverse articulations of dissent) was strongly observable, especially in the protest, media and direct-democratic arenas. Demonstrations, referendum campaigns, symbolic protests and public debates rendered disagreement highly visible and transformed dispersed grievances into collective demands. Dissent did not disappear in planning-related settings; it was more often translated into manageable issues, technical deficits or incremental improvements. This suggests that planning may incorporate conflict while simultaneously narrowing the range of legitimate forms in which dissent can appear.

Indicator 3 (Recognition of adversaries and democratic principles) was partially observable; for example, where opposing actors engaged in structured public exchanges or where administrative and civil society actors acknowledged one another’s distinct roles despite disagreements. However, activists were at times dismissed as irrational or naïve, while political and administrative actors were perceived as evasive or obstructive. Thus, the present case highlights that the existence of democratic procedures does not automatically secure mutual recognition as legitimate opponents.

Indicator 4 (Mobilisation of passions) was very clearly observable, particularly in the protest arena and in broader civil society mobilisation around cycling. Frustration, anger, fear, hope and identification were central to the persistence and expansion of the conflict, and sustained demonstrations, signature campaigns, alliance-building and long-term engagement. At the same time, passions were not always democratically stabilised: media discourse and everyday traffic conflicts sometimes intensified polarisation. Therefore, this case underlines that the mobilisation of passions is necessary but not sufficient for agonistic agency.

Indicator 5 (Focus on the democratisation of democracy) was strongly observable. Across several arenas, actors not only sought policy change within existing channels but also pursued interventions that broadened participation, pluralised agenda-setting and challenged the closure of established decision-making structures. This was particularly evident in the use of local cycling referendums and the attempted state-wide referendum, which extended the conflict into direct-democratic arenas. Simultaneously, participatory planning practices often remained bounded by limited mandates and expert-centred gatekeeping, revealing the limits of inclusion within formal planning.

Overall, the case study suggests that agonistic agency is best understood not as a fixed property pertaining to actors or institutions, but as something that is relationally produced through shifting interactions between actors, arenas and institutional logics. Its empirical observability depends not only on whether actors dissent, mobilise or seek participation, but also on whether particular arenas render these practices legible, legitimate and politically consequential. For instance, protests can politicise what planning neutralises; direct democracy can formalise what electoral institutions delay; media visibility can amplify what closed negotiations suppress and legal filtering can contain what mobilisation opens. Notably, no arena is inherently agonistic or permanently closed. The author argues that arenas can be ‘agonised’ – that is, rendered more receptive to democratic dissent, plural contestation and politicised engagement – even if only temporarily or incompletely.

For planning theory and practice, this implies that agonistic agency cannot be secured by planning procedures alone, even though they remain important. A more democratic handling of mobility conflicts may depend on recognising the legitimacy of extra-planning forms of contestation and on building institutional interfaces through which claims from other arenas can enter planning without being fully depoliticised. Hence the Bavarian cycling conflict shows not only whether agonistic agency is present or absent, but also how it is unevenly distributed, strategically enacted and repeatedly negotiated across a multi-arena conflict trajectory.